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RobertB. Hackey

The contemporaryU.S. health care system seems far removed from the pattern
of professional dominance that characterizedhealth care policymaking for most of
the twentiethcentury. Prior to the 1960s, governmentinvolvementin the practice of
medicine and in the financing of health care was severely limited in scope [Starr
1982; Somers and Somers 1961]. Hospital reimbursementwas managedby providers through a private bargainingprocess with third-partypayers. Blue Cross plans
were the dominantthird-partypayers in most states by mid-century,but neither the
Blues nor commercialinsurersexercised significantcountervailingpower [Galbraith
1956] as purchasersof health care. Blue Cross plans, in particular,were created as
"hospitalservice corporations"to provide the hospital industrywith a stable revenue
stream and were not predisposedto challenge the autonomy of providers [Stevens
1989]. Doctors and hospitals accepted new federal spending for hospital construction, medical research, and improved access for the poor and elderly but successfully resisted governmentefforts to regulatehow these funds were spent.
This article chronicles the slow but steady emergenceof countervailingpower in
the hospital industrysince mid-century.The transformationof Americanhealth care
policymakingreflects the federal government'sgrowing fiscal obligationsas the single largest purchaserof health care. As John KennethGalbraith[1956, 113] notes,
"Power on one side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailingpower from the other side." The federal government's effort to exercise countervailingpower over health care providers shows
no sign of abatingin the future, for Medicareand Medicaid costs threatenthe stabil-
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ity of the balanced budget agreement negotiatedby the Clinton administrationand
the Republicanleadershipof the 105th Congress.
Concernsabout rapidly rising health care costs led to the developmentof new institutionalarrangementsthat infringedupon the autonomyof hospitals over the past
three decades. In effect, Congress authorizedMedicare and Medicaid programs to
exercise countervailingpower in health care financingin an effort to control the spiraling cost of federal entitlementprograms. Policies that would have been unthinkable in the past-from the development of elaborate rate-settingmethodologies to
limitationson the capital investmentsand services of hospitals-were commonplace
by the early 1980s [Brown 1986]. As health care costs continuedto rise, hospitals
chafed under an ever-increasingnumberof governmentregulationsand controls. By
the 1990s, decisions about the pricing and allocationof health services, standardsof
medical practice, and the profitabilityof providers increasinglyrested in the hands
of federal policymakers.

TheBirthof the HealthCareTechnostructure
Health providers have successfully resisted frontal assaults on their professional
autonomyfor decades. Efforts to enact nationalhealth insurance,which would place
the federal governmentin the position of a monopoly purchaserof health care, met
with vociferous opposition during World War I and again in the 1930s and 1940s
[Kelley 1956]. Opponentsof nationalhealth insurancesucceeded in defining public
debate as a struggle between liberty and socialism, which threatenedboth the quality
of patient care and the core values of American society [Numbers 1982; Hackey
1997]. Although demand for health care declined during the Great Depression as
consumers' purchasingpower fell, few institutionsexisted to empowerpurchasersin
the 1930s.
Instead of bowing to federal control, health providers crafted new institutional
arrangementsto finance continuedexpansionof the health care system. As in other
policy arenas, purchasingand regulatoryinstitutionswere organizedand controlled
by the providers themselves [see McConnell 1966; Lowi 1969]. The political and
economic climate of the late 1940s and early 1950s was particularlywell suited to
the emergence of a health care technostructure,for "powerpasses to the technostructurewhen technology and planning require specialized knowledge and group
decision" [Galbraith1971, 168]. Most hospitals served local marketsin either a monopolistic or oligopolistic fashion; competitionamong providers, where it existed,
typically revolved around questions of "conspicuousconsumption"related to the
prestige of an institution's medical staff, the scope of its available services, and the
availabilityof new technologies, ratherthan to the price of services.
With encouragementfrom state insurance departments,hospitals responded to
the fiscal challenges of the Great Depression by creating "hospitalservice corpora-
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tions," commonly known as Blue Cross plans, to provide health service benefits to
subscribersfor an annualfee [Law 1976]. Unlike traditionalforms of insurance, this
arrangementset no fixed amount on total reimbursementsfor treatment,but rather
agreed to cover a specified set of services for subscribers.Since the startupcost for
such plans was subsidizedby the participatinghospitalsthemselves, both single hospital and communityplans proliferatedas a way to insure access to care for individuals and a steady revenue stream for hospitals in the 1930s. The ability of the
Blues to exercise countervailingpower was furthercircumscribedby the American
Hospital Association (AHA), which prohibited competition among Blue Cross
plans; each was given monopoly control over a state or geographic area within a
state.
Since Blue Cross plans were closely tied to the hospital industry,most were neither championsof cost containmentnor strong advocatesfor restructuringthe existing health care system. A survey of state Blue Cross plans conductedby the U.S.
Public Health Service in 1947 revealedthat more than70 percentof the board members who set policy for individualplans were affiliatedwith providers;55 percent of
all board members were representativesof the hospital industry, and an additional
17 percent represented national, state, or local medical societies [Serbein 1953,
119]. The creation of Blue Cross served an importantpurpose for hospitals, for it
enabled the industryto maintaincontrolover the pricing and use of its services. In a
system where most institutionswere reimbursedon a retrospective, fee-for-service
basis with few controls over utilization, the hospital industry'srevenue stream was
secure. As Galbraith[1971, 199] notes, "Controlof prices is for a purpose-for the
security of the technostructureand to allow plannedpursuitof its furthergoals. But
price control does little to advance these goals unless there is also control over the
amountsthat are bought and sold at these prices."
Prior to 1965, direct federal involvementin health care reimbursementand regulation was confined to several peripheralareas that had a limited effect on the nation's hospitals. With no compelling fiscal interestat stake, federal officials saw few
reasons to challenge the professional autonomy of health providers. Third-party
health insurancewas virtuallyunknown, as the moral hazard associated with offering open-ended health coverage dissuaded commercial insurers from entering the
market [Starr 1982]. In short, while the economic turmoil facing hospitals in the
1930s offered a promisingopportunityto develop countervailingpower in the health
sector, most buyers were unorganizedindividualpatientswho were ill-equipped to
capitalize on these circumstances.Efforts to rationalizethe delivery of health care
throughthe creation of prepaidgroup practices during this period provoked intense
opposition from health providers[Starr1982].
The prevailingpolicy image of health care presenteda furtherimpedimentto the
developmentof countervailingpower capable of challengingprovider dominanceof
the reimbursementprocess. The policy image of an issue or problem both explains
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the nature of a problem and suggests potential solutions to it [Baumgartnerand
Jones 1991]. Policy images reflect a set of sharedunderstandings-they define how
policies are understoodand discussed by the media, decision makers(e.g., members
of Congress, the president), and the public. In particular,"by contrivingan appropriate image of the position, prospects, problems or dangers of the state the industrial system can insure a reaction favorableto its needs" [Galbraith1971, 328]. For
much of the twentieth century, additionalspendingon building new health care facilities and expandingthe range of services availableto the public were seen in uniformly positive terms. In 1932, the final report of the Committee on the Cost of
Medical Care defined the nation's health policy agendain terms of increasingaccess
to care to all members of the population[Stevens 1989]. For health providers, this
endorsementreflected a societal commitmentto increasinginvestmentin health care
throughadditionalsupportfor research, infrastructuredevelopment,and the medical
profession.
The Committee's agendawas soon embracedby nationalpolicymakers,business
leaders, and the public. A congruence of values among providers, policymakers,
and the public is not unexpected, for "muchof what is believed to be socially important is, in fact, the adaptationof social attitudesto the goal system of the technostructure. What counts here is what is believed" [Galbraith 1971, 163]. The
positive policy image of health providersand of additionalhealth care spending did
not lend itself to the mobilizationand organizationof health care purchasers,allowing hospitals and their allies (e.g., Blue Cross plans) to dominatethe reimbursement
process. A solid majorityof citizens endorsedthe expansionof voluntaryhealth insurancecoverage; free medical care for mothers, infants, and the needy; and expansion of the Social Security system to include sickness benefits [Erskine 1975].
Concerns over access, not cost containment, also dominated the health policy
agenda in Congress during the 1940s and l950s, as issue entrepreneurssought to
expand coverage to underservedgroups and to increase the supply of physicians and
hospitals.

ThePoliticsof Accomodation:
FederalHealth
CarePoliciesin the 1940sand 1950s
The federal government's early forays into health care financingwere relatively
innocuous from the perspective of health providers. During the 1930s, the federal
Works Progress Administrationconstructedand renovatedhundredsof hospitals nationwide. The Lanham Act, passed in 1941, provided more than $120 million to
build or upgrade hospital facilities in geographic areas where defense plants and
military bases were located as part of the war effort [see Stevens 1989, 208-11]. In
the 1940s and 1950s, federalhealthpolicies were aimed at winning the political support of constituents and health providers, both of whom clamored for more, not
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less, spending on health care. Beginning in the late 1940s, the Hospital Survey and
ConstructionAct of 1946, best known as the Hill-Burtonprogram,provided federal
funds for the constructionand modernizationof hospital facilities and imposed few
binding restrictions on providers [Lave and Lave 1974]. Federal programs subsidized care for the indigent and poor elderly, provided health services to Indian
tribes under the aegis of the IndianHealth Service, and cared for veteransand military personnel througha separatesystem of hospitals operatedby the Veterans' Administrationand the respective military services [Serbein 1953]. At the same time,
federal support for basic medical research expandedat a rapid pace under the auspices of the National Institutesof Health (NIH). Federal research funds were also
used to purchase inpatienthospital care for indigent patientsundergoingdiagnostic
testing for cancer, tuberculosis,and venereal disease throughprogramsadministered
by the National Cancer Instituteand the U.S. Public Health Service [Serbein 1953,
257-60]. None of these initiatives challenged the prerogatives or autonomy of
providers-all were popular distributiveprograms that enjoyed widespread public
and congressionalsupport.
The Hill-Burtonprogramwas designed to increasepublic access to qualityhealth
care services by subsidizing hospital construction. Since the prevailing view from
the 1940s through the mid-1960s was that increased access to medical care would
improve the overall health of the population, federal health policies during this period increased spending on health care facilities and personnel. Although Hill-Burton was intended to target benefits to rural and underservedareas, the immense
popularityof hospital constructionled Congressto spreadprogramfundingthroughout their districts, rather than funneling funds to poorer, rural areas. Hill-Burton
made it possible for members of Congress to claim credit for worthy projects in
their districts on an annual basis; during the first five years of the program, more
than 1,700 separateprojects were approved, addingmore than 80,000 hospital beds
across the nationat a cost of more than $400 million [Serbein 1953, 276-77].
Federal supportfor increasinghealth care facilities, personnel, and researchduring this period reflects Galbraith's[1971, 164] observationthat "successfulplanning
in areas of expensive and sophisticatedtechnology requiresthat the state underwrite
costs, including the costs of research and development, and that it insure a market
for the resulting products." Federal policies ensured that consumer demand for
health care services would continue to rise, for unions were encouragedto bargain
for health insuranceand other nonwage "fringebenefits" in lieu of additionalcompensation during the wartime economy of the 1940s to slow inflationarypressures
on wages. Private health insurance coverage expanded rapidly during the 1950s,
prompting many critics of nationalhealth insuranceto suggest that comprehensive
federal reform was no longer needed [Hackey 1997]; by the mid-1950s, more than
100 million Americans were covered by private health insurance [Stevens 1971].
Health care financing duringthis period illustratesGalbraith's[1971, 299] observa-
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tion that "theline between public and privateauthorityin the industrialsystem is indistinct, and in large measure imaginary."Over the course of a decade, hospitals
succeeded in securing federal subsidies for new constructionprojects, lowered the
cost of charity care, and increased the ability of the poor elderly to purchase their
services.

The first direct federal involvement in provider reimbursementcame in 1950,
when Congress authorized a system of "vendorpayments" to compensate health
providers for free care given to persons receiving public assistance. As Rosemary
Stevens notes [1989, 269], "The advent of vendor payments, with their direct assumption of government purchase of care .

.

. assumed, in effect, that private char-

ity giving to the poor-Thy hospitals and physicians-ought to be unnecessary."This
assumption became the unofficial dogma within the hospital industry and was
adopted by both the federal governmentand AHA as the proper method for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of charity care (later known as uncompensatedcare).
The passage of the Kerr-Millsprogramin 1960 expandedthe federal government's
role in providing coverage for the poor by subsidizingmedical care for the elderly
through federal matching funds provided to state medical assistance programs.
While neither vendor payments nor the Kerr-Millsprogramhad an appreciableimpact on the financing of health services, both legitimatedfederal involvementin the
financingof health care.
The implementationof vendor paymentsand Kerr-Mills,however, raised the ire
of providersover what they perceived to be inadequatereimbursementfor the costs
associated with furnishingcharity care. In an effort to define the terms of relationships between hospitals and purchasersof healthcare, the AHA publishedits Principles for the Payment of Hospital Care in 1953. The Principles established retrospective, cost-based reimbursementas the industry's standardoperatingprocedure
and declared that hospitals should be reimbursedfor the full cost of treatinga patient. Under this system, which was subsequentlyadoptedby Blue Cross plans and
endorsedby both the federal vendor paymentsand the Kerr-Millsprogram,purchasers of health care had little marketleverage to control either the price or the utilization of health care services.
Each of the principal federal initiatives in the two decades following the end of
World War II served importantpurposes for providers without threateningtheir
autonomy. Federal investment in hospital constructionunder the Hill-Burtonprogram simultaneouslyaddressedthe desire of providers for additionalcapital investment, of physicians for more sophisticated"workshops"[Pauly and Redisch 1973],
and the public's concerns about improving access to care, particularlyin the nation's poor and rural communities. The expansion of the Veterans' Administration
hospital system and its close affiliation with graduatemedical programs provided
medical school faculty and students with a steady supply of patients on which to
practice their skills. Finally, the federal government's role as a third-partypayer
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during this period, throughboth the vendor-paymentsprogramand Kerr-Mills, relieved hospitals of the fiscal burden associatedwith providing care for the indigent
and the poor elderly. Federal investments, with few strings attached, won praise
from providersas sound public policy and served an importantelectoral purpose for
membersof Congress.

TheDominanceof the HealthCareTechnostructure
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid marked a turning point in organized
medicine's influence over health care policymaking. The American Medical Association's (AMA) strident opposition to any form of "socialized medicine" in the
years leading up to 1965 made both administrationofficials and congressional leaders wary of alienatingproviders in draftinghealth legislation [Jacobs 1992]. In an
effort to accommodateproviders' concerns, the initial design of the Medicare reimbursement system reflects Galbraith's [1971, 307] observation that "[the modern
corporation]has won an accommodationby the state to its needs that is highly favorable." While federalpolicymakers'decisions to acceleratedepreciationof capital
projects and to adopt the AHA's Principlesfor the Paymentof Hospital Care as the
basis for provider paymentunder Medicareand Medicaid ensureda smooth takeoff
for the programs [Feder 1977; Thompson 1981], they ignited an inflationaryspiral
in the health care industry. The passage, and subequentimplementation,of Medicare markedthe zenith of the hospitals' influence over healthcare policy.
The "adaptationof public goals to the goals of the technostructure"[Galbraith
1971, 312] occurredthroughoutthe implementationprocess, as strong providerrepresentationon the principaladvisory bodies enabled hospitals and physicians to advocate for advantageous financing arrangements. Nowhere was this pattern of
accommodationmore visible than in the implementationof Medicare. Provider input was solicited for all key decisions regardingreimbursement,utilization, standards of care, and the certification of physicians, hospitals, and home health
providers [Feder 1977]. Veiled threatsabout a providerboycott of Medicare, which
could potentially cripple the program and embarrassthe administration,continued
throughoutthe year-long rule-makingprocess leading up to the program's startup.
The administration'sconcerns about a boycott of the programwere reflected in the
organizationof the Bureau of Hospital Insurance's(BHI) principal advisory councils-the Health Insurance Benefits Advisory Council (HIBAC) and the National
Medical Review Committee (NMRC). The HIBAC mediated disputes among
providers, third-partyhealth insurers, and SSA officials and consideredall issues relating to the organization, financing, and delivery of program services in the year
before program startup. As one of the primary policy incubators for Medicare's
rule-making process, the HIBAC afforded providers significant leverage over the
implementationprocess, for nine of the council's sixteen memberswere physicians
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[Somers and Somers 1967, 32]. Although the membershipof the NMRC had not
been appointedbefore the program's startup,the enabling legislation mandatedthat
a majorityof the committee's nine membersmust be physiciansand that other members should be selected from "organizationsand associationsof professionalpersonnel in the field of medicine and other individualswho are outstandingin the field of
medicine or related fields; except that at least one membershall be representativeof
the general public" [Somers and Somers 1967, 31-32].
In this context, federal officials were reluctantto fully exercise their newfound
leverage over health providers. AlthoughLawrenceJacobs [1992] suggests that public opinion strongly influenced the implementationof Medicare, the developmentof
Medicare's retrospectivecost-based reimbursementsystem using fiscal intermediaries reflects James Q. Wilson's [1980, 369] descriptionof client politics, in which an
"easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize
and lobby; the costs and benefits are distributedat a low per capita rate over a large
number of people, and thus they have little incentive to organize in opposition-if
indeed, they even hear of the policy."
If hospitals had lost the war over extending health insurance to the elderly in
1965 (see Marmor [1971] for an excellent account), they won the first battles over
reimbursementin the years that followed. The end result was a boon for the industry. In additionto extending insurancecoverage to a large segmentof the population
that had historically underutilized medical services, hospitals won federal reimbursementfor the indirect costs of patient care such as capital expendituresand depreciation [Somers 1969]. Although the BHI determined eligibility and paid for
Medicare subscribers' benefits, responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the
program was delegated to "fiscal intermediaries,"90 percent of which were Blue
Cross plans. Proponentsof the concept arguedthat both Medicareand the hospitals
would "benefitfrom the relationships[the intermediaries]have establishedwith hospitals, physicians and others who furnishhealthcare" [Feder 1977, 37].
Utilization review audits to ensure that providers did not overcharge Medicare
for unnecessary services were also conducted by intermediaries,thus linking responsibility for payment and oversight within an administrativestructuredominated
by health providers. Furthermore,since providerswere free to contractwith their
choice of fiscal intermediariesto handle Medicare claims processing, a Blue Cross
plan that tried to "get tough" with hospitals on issues of quality and cost containment could find itself without a contract.Withoutstrong incentives to act otherwise,
few Blue Cross plans risked the financialbenefits from their statusas intermediaries
to do the government's dirty work; most accommodated,rather than antagonized,
hospitals.
Following the practice of most Blue Cross plans, Medicareagreed to reimburse
hospitals on the basis of "usual,customaryand reasonable"(UCR) fees and charges
within a geographic area. This mode of reimbursementwas decidedly inflationary,
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for as the average fee level rose in an area, so did the definitionof what qualified as
usual, customary, and reasonable.Hospitals had no incentive to limit the growth of
costs, for to do so would reduce revenues. Instead, hospitals saw Medicare as a
source of funds for capitalexpansionand aggressivelypressed for reimbursementon
a 'cost-plus"basis, arguing that even nonprofitinstitutionsneeded a modest surplus
over their operating expenses to provide capital for renovation, expansion, and research [Somers 1969]. Providers reached a compromise with federal officials that
added an additional2 percentto Medicarereimbursementsto cover "othercosts" associated with providing care to programbeneficiaries. As a result of this compromise, Medicare pumped millions of additionaldollars into hospital coffers with no
strings attached, setting off a hospital constructionbonanza in the late 1960s and
early 1970s; Medicare's payments to hospitals grew from $891 million in 1966 to
$4.7 billion in 1969.

TheEnd of Consensus
After 1965, the policy image of health care changed as decision makers and the
public came to view additionalspendingon health care as a "crisis"that had to be
controlled, ratherthan as an "investment"in needed programsfor underservedsegments of the population. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid gave federal officials a direct interestin health care cost containment.The health care cost explosion
in the years after 1965 led to fundamentalchanges in the relationshipbetween public
officials and providers and other societal interests. As the policy image of health
care shifted, the interests of elected officials shifted as well; rising costs provided
federal officials with a reason to intervenein the fiscal affairs of the hospital industry for the first time. Beginningin the late 1960s, cost-consciousfederal policymakers looked to new institutions to exercise leverage over the industry, placing
government increasingly at odds with the hospital industry technostructure.Initial
restrictionson providersin the 1960s and 1970s were modest, but the scope of federal "rationalizingstrategies"to control the rapidly rising cost of entitlementprograms expanded over time. By the 1980s, the line between governmentat both the
state and federal levels and the technostructurewas increasinglyclear, as public officials embraced the pursuit of hospital cost containment in a "government-led
search for solutions to government'sown problems"[Brown 1983, 45]. Until governmentofficials possessed the statutoryauthorityto exercise leverage over the fiscal affairs of hospitals, power over health care policymakingremained squarely in
the hands of providers.
Robert Higgs [1987] contendsthat crisis, either perceived or real, is a precondition for the expansionof governmentauthority.When policy debates are defined by
the rhetoric of crisis, ideological opposition to the use of public authoritybreaks
down as the public becomes anxious for governmentto "do something"to cope with
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the crisis. The rhetoric of crisis has been a common feature in health care policymaking over the past three decades. As policymakers, the mass public, and the media trumpeted the system's ills, opportunities arose for resourceful policy
entrepreneursto assemble coalitions in supportof expandingpublic authorityover
the hospital industry.
As Congress began to view health care expendituresas budget busters, rather
than as investments, legislators approveda variety of cost-controlexperimentsin an
effort to limit rising entitlementspending. To do so, Congress created new institutional structures,centralizeddecision-makingauthorityover hospital reimbursement
and capital investment, and invested state and federal regulatoryagencies with new
statutorymandatesand policy tools to increase their leverage over health providers
and third-partypayers. Since countervailing power was effectively absent from
health care financing, the federal government used its growing market share to
reshape the health care market in the 1970s and 1980s. Federal policies toward
health care financing in the years since 1965 can be seen as a series of attemptsto
cope with the compromises made during the implementationof Medicareand Medicaid [Brown 1983]. After 1965, federal and state governmentsbecame the largest
purchasersof hospital services, providingpublic officials with a direct and immediate interest in controllingthe price of medical services.
The process of creating countervailingpower in the health care industry, however, was incremental and slow. Federal policymakers faced the difficult task of
building the government's regulatoryand planning capacity in a political environment dominatedby health providers. Early governmentefforts to regulatethe hospital industry resembled Stephen Skowronek's [1982] description of American
political development during the late nineteenthcentury, in which new institutions
developed, but "governmentalelites could not sustainsupportfor efforts that threatened to underminelong-establishedpolitical and institutionalrelationships."

The Trialsand Tribulations
of HealthPlanning
Health planningappearedto offer a palatablesolution to "rationalize"the organization and financing of health services in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The emphasis on planning by both federal and state governmentswas largely a by-product
of Milton Roemer's [1961] dictum thata bed built is a bed filled; doctors and hospitals could, in essence, fill empty beds by increasingthe demandfor hospitalservices
in their choice of treatments[see Pauly and Redisch 1973]. Since patientswere insulated from the true cost of treatmentby extensive hospital insurancecoverage [Feldstein 1971; Pauly 1980, 17-20], neither doctors, hospitals, nor patients had an
incentive to restrictutilizationof hospital facilities. If Roemer was correct, the logical solution to rising utilizationand health care costs would be to restrictthe growth
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of hospital facilities in the expectationthat "abed not built is a bed not used" [Dunham 1981].
The federal government'sfirst effort to coordinatehealth care services under the
ComprehensiveHealth Planning Act of 1966 [Pub. L. 89-749] has been described
as a "half-heartedcommitment" that achieved few tangible results [West and
Stevens 1976, 175]. The ComprehensiveHealthPlanning(CHP) Act createda planning and regulatoryprogramon trainingwheels; planningagencies were dominated
by provider groups, lacked technical expertise, and had little legal authorityto enforce compliance with the state and local plans they developed. Since federal funding for planningagencies was contingentupon the ability of state and local matching
funds, many CHP agencies were dependenton hospitals and third-partypayers for
funding, data analysis, and even basic informationabout the functioning of local
health care systems [West and Stevens 1976, 179]. Given the ambiguityof the statute, state and local plannershad few incentives to pursuecost control, for both state
and local planning agencies emphasizedneeds assessment and the identificationof
opportunitiesfor resource sharing and cooperation. When viewed in this light, the
federal government'sfirst attemptto control costs via healthplanningbears out Galbraith's predictionthat a "fusion"of tasks would develop between the technostructure and the state. Pub. L. 89-749 illustratedhow "membersof the technostructure
work closely with their public counterparts. . . in advising them of their needs"
[Galbraith1971, 395].
Federal regulationof the hospital industryincreasedmarkedlyafter the passage
of the Health Planningand ResourceDevelopmentAct in 1974 [Pub. L. 93-641] established more than 200 federally fundedlocal health planningagencies. These new
health systems agencies (HSAs), working in concert with state health planning and
resource developmentagencies (SHPDAs), were responsible for assessing regional
health needs and were expected to regulate the constructionand expansion of new
health care facilities. Planners, however, lacked the authorityto impose effective
sanctions upon hospitals [Vladeck 1979]. Even their supportersacknowledgedthat
the new agencies were beset by multiple (and often conflicting) goals, lacked the
requisite authorityto pursue these goals, and offered budding planners few incentives to engage in trench warfare with local hospitals [Luft and Frisvold 1979]. In
addition, as Harvey Sapolsky [1991, 822] argues, "Physicians,and more relevantly,
hospital administrators,quickly discoveredthat the planningsystem could be outmaneuvered. The system was not much of an obstacle once the consultantswere called
in to advise."
State and federal certificate-of-need(CON) programs suffered from the same
shortcomingas systemwide planningefforts; both placed too much hope on a program with multiple objectives to control health care costs [see Brown 1981; Bovbjerg 1988]. CON programsoffered state and federal officials a tool to influence the
decisions of health care providers to expand or modify existing facilities and serv-
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ices, but efforts to decertify beds or restrictthe diffusion of profitablenew technologies were vehemently opposed by health providers [Carpenterand Paul-Shaheen
1984]. States with aggressive CON programs soon found themselves in court, as
providers challenged the statutoryauthorityof state and local planningagencies, the
representativenessof HSAs, and the interpretationof state-enablinglegislation and
health-planningdocuments. Furthermore,the most critical decisions-those that affected the level of reimbursementfor hospital services-remained beyond the scope
of planners'jurisdiction.
Despite the limitationsof the planningprocess createdby Pub. L. 93-641, HSAs
opened up the decision-makingprocess to new groups. Since a majorityof representatives on local planning bodies were requiredto be "consumers"-defined in
practice as non-providers--business leaders and citizens with no formal ties to the
health care industrybecame increasingly active in health policy debates during the
1970s and 1980s. Uncertaintyreigned as new groups clamoredfor seats at the table
and existing groups fought for representationto protect their interests[Marmorand
Morone 1981].

The Prospects and Pitfalls of Price Regulation
Even before the passage of the Health Planningand Resource Development Act
of 1974, Congress began to experiment with other institutionallevers to control
health care costs. While health planningprogramsgarneredthe lion's share of attention during the 1970s, federal officials were quietly reshapingthe mechanismsused
to pay health providers. Health care financing reforms over the past two decades
emerged from a set of arrangementsaptly describedby LawrenceBrown [1985] as a
process of "technocraticcorporatism"in which payers, providers, and government
bureaucratsbargainedover technical modificationsto the paymentsystem. In retrospect, Clark Havighurst's[1986] assertionthatdecision makingin health care would
increasinglydevolve to the consumersof health services proved to be correct, but in
an unexpected fashion. Far from the decentralizedmarketsystem driven by individual choice that was envisioned by supportersof procompetitivereform, power devolved into the hands of the largest "consumers"-federal and state governments.
The result was a "refederalization"of health care decision making, ratherthan the
decentralizationanticipatedby conservatives[Rabe 1987].
The federal government's first efforts to limit its financialexposure were aimed
at undoing some of the excesses that accompaniedthe implementationof Medicare
and Medicaid. The first targetof federal cost-cutterswas the 2 percent "plusfactor"
grantedto providersto provide working capital for facilities improvementsand new
services. While repeal of the plus factor in 1969 irked providers, it did nothing to
change the fundamentaldesign of the Medicare paymentsystem. The first substantial change in Medicare's relationshipwith health providers did not come until the
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passage of the Social Security Amendmentsof 1972 [Pub. L. 92-603]. Section 223
of the 1972 Social SecurityAct introduceda prospectivecomponentto Medicare reimbursement that limited the federal government's reimbursementof "allowable
costs" for inpatientcare to 120 percent of the mean for such costs for a peer group
of hospitals. While the cap was graduallylowered to 108 percent of mean costs between 1975 and 1982, the Section 223 limits placed no restrictionson reimbursement for "nonroutine"operating costs associated with interest payments, depreciation, or the cost of ancillary services [Office of Technology Assessment 1986,
23].
The cap's effectiveness was limited, for the system remained primarily retrospective and cost-based; Section 223 was intendedto provide high-cost "outlier"institutions with an incentive to hold down costs. Hospitals whose charges did not
deviate significantly from their peer group mean were largely unaffected by these
changes. Despite its limited scope, Section 223 marked a radical departurefrom
past policy-for the first time, the federal governmentplaced a prospective cap on
hospital reimbursement,which affected a significantpercentage of the institutional
caseload. Section 1122 of the Social Security Amendmentsalso strengthenedthe
hand of state and local planningagencies by prohibitingthe use of federal funds to
reimbursethe capital expendituresof providers for "unnecessary"projects that had
not received prior approval from state planning agencies. Although relatively few
institutionswere adversely affected by these changes, Pub. L. 92-603's limits on allowable costs and its restrictionson capital-expenditurereimbursementrepresented
a fundamentalbreak from the principles of cost-based reimbursementdeveloped by
the industryover the previous two decades.
The Social Security Amendmentsof 1972 also producedanother significant reform that would have widespreadramificationsfor the regulationof the hospital industry over the next decade. While the provisions of Section 223 were aimed at
outlier hospitalswhose costs far exceeded nationalpeer-groupaverages, Section 222
of the 1972 act authorized the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) to fund demonstrationprojectsand experimentsto test various cost-containment measures that would apply to all hospitals in a geographic area. Under the
terms of the demonstrationprojects, HEW agreed to absorb any losses it might incur if the experiments failed to achieve their cost-control targets and actual costs
proved to be higher than under HEW's own reimbursementmethodology. In the
long run, Section 222 had a tremendousimpact on health care regulationand reimbursementpolicies, for it encouragedthe proliferationof state rate-settingexperiments during the 1970s and early 1980s.
State-level experimentationredefined the relationshipsbetween payers, providers, and government regulatoryagencies, particularlyin states where all hospital
revenues were subject to control by state regulatoryagencies [Hackey 1998]. All
payer rate-settingprogramsachieved considerablecost savings and limited the abil-
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ity of hospitals to shift costs from regulated payers (usually state Medicaid programs) to unregulatedcommercialinsurersand paying patients[Coelen et al. 1988].
In addition to strengtheningthe hand of state health care bureaucracies,however,
the demonstrationprojects funded under Section 222 provided HEW officials with
opportunities for extensive policy learning. The full impact of the Section 222
waiver process was not felt nationwideuntil 1983, when Medicareincorporatedthe
lessons of New Jersey's prospective hospital rate-settingmethodology as the basis
for its new prospectivepaymentsystem (PPS).
Health care inflation occupied the attention of policymakers throughout the
1970s, as increases in hospital prices consistently outstrippedthe general inflation
rate. After wage and price controls were lifted in 1974, hospital costs increasedby
$14.5 billion from 1974 to 1975, the largest single-year increase in the nation's history [Congressional Quarterly 1978, 500]. Medicare outlays for hospital insurance
increased by 387 percent in the decade following the 1972 Social Security Amendments, from $6.8 billion in FY1973 to $33.3 billion in FY1982; inpatienthospital
care accounted for more than 65 percent of all Medicare programreimbursements
by 1984 [HCFA 1988, 20-21].
After taking office, PresidentJimmy Cartermade hospitalcost control one of his
top legislative priorities. In 1977, the presidentproposedthe most ambitiousattempt
to regulate the hospital industry to date; the administration'sproposed legislation
(H.R. 6575/S. 1391) sought to cap hospital revenue growth from all sources to a 9
percent annual rate and imposed strict limits on the constructionof new health care
facilities. Carteractively campaignedfor the bill, promising that its passage would
"slow a devastating inflationary trend, which doubles health costs every five
years. . . . The cost of [health] care is rising so rapidly it jeopardizes our health
goals and our other important social objectives" [Congressional Quarterly 1978,
499-500]. Providers, however, argued that such extensive federal interventionwas
unnecessary. Hospital industryofficials expressed confidence that the industrycould
control costs through "voluntaryrestraint."In 1979, Congress decided to give the
industrya chance to prove itself, ending furtherdiscussionof federalprice controls.
The Legitimation of Behavioral Controlson the Hospital Industry
The effort at voluntaryrestraintby hospitalswas a spectacularfailure, which severely underminedthe industry's credibility in Congress; nationalexpendituresfor
hospital care rose 36 percent, from $87.9 billion in 1979 to $119.6 billion in 1981,
while Medicare outlays for hospital services rose 45.6 percent in the same period,
from $21.7 billion in 1979 to $31.6 billion in 1981 [Chulis 1991, 196]. Passage of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 [Pub. L. 97-248]
sounded the death knell for the system of retrospective, cost-based reimbursement
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that the hospital industryhad fought to preserve [Office of Technology Assessment
1986, 23].
TEFRA imposed the most significant limitations on Medicare payments to
providers since the program'sinceptionin 1965 by extendingthe Section 223 limits
to include ancillary departmentsand special care units and by imposing an absolute
ceiling on reimbursementfor costs associated with providing inpatientcare. Under
the TEFRA reimbursementformula, hospitals would only be reimbursed for the
lower of a prospectively set target rate or 120 percent of the average cost per case
for a peer group of hospitals [Office of Technology Assessment 1986, 23]. The new
measures also provided an incentive for hospitals to improve the efficiency of their
operations, since costs above the cap would not be reimbursed.In addition, TEFRA
marked the federal government'sfirst use of a hospital's case mix to determineinpatient reimbursement.Hospital per diem costs were adjustedfor both the type and
severity of illness on the basis of a classificationsystem that grouped similar medical procedures into "diagnosis-relatedgroups" (DRGs). DRGs were developed in
the mid-1970s by researchersat Yale University Medical School to separate inpatient hospital proceduresinto a fixed numberof diagnosticcategories. Since patients
in a DRG have similar clinical conditions that require similar treatments,they are
expected to consume roughlycomparableamountsof a hospital's resources.
TEFRA signaled the federal government'snew willingness to use the rate of reimbursementas a lever to bring hospitalcosts undercontrol. The growing burdenof
the Medicare and Medicaid programs led federal officials to pursue cost containment, despite howls of protest from the hospital industryand health providers. The
rationalizingpolitics of cost containmentunderscoreda growing divergence in the
political interests of federal policymakersand the health care technostructure.Beginning in 1982, for the first time, a significantfractionof hospitals' revenues were
determinedon a prospective, ratherthan a retrospective,basis. The switch to prospective reimbursementwas significant from a state-buildingperspective, for the
adoption of a prospective payment system shifted control over hospital reimbursement from providers to the Health Care Financing Administration.Under the new
system, federal bureaucrats,not hospital administrators,set reimbursementrates for
all inpatienthospital services.
The TEFRA limits were viewed as a threat by the hospital industry because
Medicare's new formula paid for hospital services largely on the basis of institutions' average costs. The federal government'snew approachto hospital reimbursement led to the political fragmentationof the hospital industry, for while all
hospitals benefited from the cost-based, retrospective system of reimbursement,
some institutionsfared well under prospectivepayment, while others struggled. As
long as providerscould earn additionalrevenuesby passing along higher costs to the
federal government, few incentives existed for institutionsto reorganizetheir delivery of care. By setting a nationalaverage payment rate and adjustingpayments to
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providers to account for differencesin their patients'severity of illness, TEFRA pitted the interestsof urbanteachinghospitalsand traumacenters, which treatedsicker
than average patients, against many of their suburbanand for-profit counterparts.
Under TEFRA and its successor, a hospital's profitabilitywas closely tied to its
ability to keep costs below the pre-establishedrate of payment. To do so, hospitals
treated a growing proportionof their patients on an "outpatient"basis to limit the
use of resources, cut staffing, and sought to squeeze out additionaleconomies in
purchasing and "dischargeplanning"to minimize patients' length of stay [Iglehart
1993].
Ballooning deficits contributedto the new rhetoricof crisis and legitimatedpolicy choices that had been politically infeasible five years earlier. Commitmentto
cost control was a bipartisanmatterin the 1970s and 1980s, as the most sweeping
price regulations to date in the health sector were introducedin 1982 and 1983 at
the behest of a conservative Republicanpresident who had campaignedon a platform of reducing government regulation and intervention in the private sector.
TEFRA was a radical departurefrom past practice, which placed many hospitals
that treated a sicker than average (i.e., high-cost) patient populationat a considerable disadvantage.TEFRA did not representa temporaryinconvenience for health
providers, as Pub. L. 97-248 directed the Secretaryof Health and HumanServices
(HHS) to recommend to Congress a more permanentprospective reimbursement
system for inpatientcare underMedicareby 1983.
HHS had relatively few options to choose from in suggesting a comprehensive
reform of Medicare's hospital payment policies. The one option that had been
widely discussed within the department,however, was New Jersey's ongoing allpayer rate-settingexperimentusing DRGs. HCFA had pressed New Jersey officials
to adopt a DRG-based system in the late 1970s to explore the feasibility of a casebased prospective payment system for inpatienthospital care [Morone and Dunham
1985]. Given its limited time frame and the absence of other viable options, HHS
recommendedin its December 1982 report to Congress that Medicare phase in a
prospective reimbursementsystem modeled after the HCFA demonstrationproject
in New Jersey. Medicare's new (PPS) was passed as part of the 1983 Social Security Amendments(Pub. L. 98-2 1) amid little debate after a brief four-monthgestation period in Congress. The passage of Medicare's PPS followed a familiar
pattern, as the hospital industrytechnostructureendorsedthe plan and worked with
key congressional leaders and administrationofficials to develop the new DRGbased payment system. Like the previous reformsof the nation'shealth care financing system during the 1970s, PPS emerged out of a relatively closed, "technocratic"
bargainingprocess that received little attentionfrom the media or the mass public
[Brown 1985].
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A FrayingAUliance
betweenHospitalsandthe FederalGovernment
Hospital industry representativeswelcomed the change from the crude and restrictive payment criteria provided under TEFRA, for PPS's treatmentof case-mix
differences among hospitals represented a significant advance over the previous
methodology; the proposal won the endorsementof the AHA and the Federationof
American Hospitals. PPS payment rates were initially set at a high level to allay
provider fears of fiscal catastropheunder the new system. Indeed, the Medicare
margins (i.e., net operatingprofits) for all hospitals exceeded 14 percent duringthe
program's first two years, as Medicare paymentsper hospital discharge increased
by 18.6 percent in FY1985 and 10.5 percent in FY1986 [Altman 1995]. Generous
reimbursementrates in the first three years of PPS led to recordprofits in the hospital industry, as the net operatingmargin for Medicarepatientsexceeded 10 percent
[Russell 1989] and total revenue margins for communityhospitals exceeded 5 percent from 1984 to 1986. The rising tide lifted all boats, for hospitals in all ownership categories reportedpositive Medicaremarginsin FY1985 and FY1986 [Altman
1995]. During the three-year transition period from TEFRA to PPS, Medicare
agreed to use regional, ratherthan national, averages to determinehospital costs to
ease the adjustmentfor hospitals located in regions with above-averagecosts as a result of chronic labor shortages. Under this system of "blended"rates, the proportion
of the prospective rate that was based on a hospital's historical costs declined over
time as the share of the rate determinedby nationalaveragerates increased.
Over time, however, HCFA's accommodativepolicy toward the hospital industry became increasingly restrictive. Medicare marginsbegan to decline in 1986 and
fell steadily until 1993. Adjustmentsto PPS rates fell from double digits in the program's first two years to 3.3 percent in FY1987 and lagged behind the overall rate
of medical inflation for the remainderof the decade [Altman 1995]. In retrospect,
the generous rates of payment under PPS designed to reassure providers that the
new paymentsystem would remain "budgetneutral"in its first years seem insignificant, for Medicare reaped considerablesavings under the new system as hospitals
changed their behavior to conform to the incentives of a case-based reimbursement
system: admissions declined, as did the average length of stay for patients [Russell
1989]. As HCFA officials began to tighten the financial screws on inpatientreimbursementduring the shift from individualhistoricalcosts to lower nationaland regional rates, PPS operatingmargins for hospitals fell precipitously;by 1990, most
hospitals were losing money on Medicare patients [Guterman,Altman, and Young
1990]. This was not an unanticipatedconsequence, for as Karen Davis and Diane
Rowland [1986, 79] note, "theprincipal savings in the system come from limiting
increases in the average paymentrate over time."
The implementationof Medicare's PPS also increased fragmentationwithin the
hospital industryby linking the level of paymentto a hospital's location (e.g., urban
vs. rural), teaching status, and the nature of the population served. Opposition to
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PPS within the hospital industryvaried considerably,as some institutionsprospered
while others struggled to survive [ProPAC 1994; Rosko and Carpenter1994]. Hospitals in ruralareas were seriously affected by PPS, and the rapidrise in the number
of rural hospital closures during the 1980s exacerbatedconcerns about access to
care in rural America [Christianson,Moscovice, and Tao 1993; Goody 1993]. Rural institutionsbegan to lose money on Medicarepatients in FY1987 and continued
to experience net operatingmarginsinto the early 1990s [Altman 1995]. In contrast,
urban government hospitals, voluntary institutions, and proprietaryhospitals fared
quite well under PPS despite declining operatingmargins. Indeed, while both proprietary and voluntary hospitals reported net losses on Medicare patients from
FY1991 to FY1993, both recordednet operatingprofits by FY1994 [Altman 1995].
Overall, the introductionof Medicare's PPS led to statisticallysignificantreductions
in the length of hospital stays, cost per admission, labor cost per admission, and per
capita hospital admissionsby the mid-1980s [Sloan, Morrisey, and Valvona 1988].
Under PPS, a hospital's fiscal health dependedon both its case mix (i.e., the severity of patients' illnesses) and its payer mix (i.e., the percentageof hospital revenues generatedby different third-partyinsurers). Institutionsserving predominantly
poor inner-city communitieswere increasinglyhard pressed to make ends meet by
the end of the decade, despite Medicare's efforts to compensate institutions that
treated a "disproportionateshare"of indigent patients. Since these institutionstypically had fewer patients with privatehealth insuranceplans that still paid on the basis of charges, many inner-city hospitals found it difficult to emulate the costshifting behavior of their suburbancounterparts,in which privately insuredpatients
were charged higher rates than those covered by Medicare or Medicaid (see Abraham [1993] for an excellent accountof the difficulties facing such institutions).
PPS fundamentallychanged the financial incentives for hospital reimbursement.
Under the cost-based system in effect from 1966 to 1982, hospitals sought to keep
patients in the hospital for as long as possible, for longer stays and additionalclinical interventionsincreased revenues. Medicare's PPS contributedto the restructuring of the hospital industry, as the number of hospital beds, inpatientadmissions,
inpatientdays, length of stay, and average occupancyrates fell duringthe 1980s, as
hospitals scrambled to transfer patients to more profitable "outpatient"settings.
Hospitals also acquired a financial incentive to discipline physicians who "wasted
resources"by keeping patientsin the hospitaltoo long, for additionalservices represented either lost profits or an operating loss [Iglehart 1993]. Institutions soon
adaptedto the new payment system, leading to rising revenue margins for community hospitals in the late 1980s and early 1990s despite the fact that annualincreases
in Medicarepaymentsper hospital dischargefell from 6.6 percentin FY1990 to 3.5
percent in FY1994 [Altman 1995]. Hospitals employed small armies of professional
coders whose sole task was to determine the most appropriateand most profitable
DRG for each Medicare patient admittedor treated. The use of creative DRG cod-
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ing to inflate hospital revenues (known as "upcoding"or "DRG creep") added an
entire consulting industry to the health care technostructureto enable hospitals to
"enhance"their Medicarerevenues.

Conclusion
As Galbraith[1956, 136] argues, "The supportof countervailingpower has become in modem times perhapsthe majordomestic peacetime functionof the federal
government."Until the creationof large federal entitlementsto provide health care
for the elderly and low-income residentsin the 1960s, however, congressionalpolicymakershad few incentives to intervenein the internalaffairs of the hospital industry. By the early 1970s, the growing cost of government-sponsoredhealth insurance
led to the developmentof new federal policies aimed at restructuringthe incentives
of the reimbursementprocess. The transformationin the role of the state in financing health care was accompaniedby new institutionaldevelopmentsdesigned to enhance its control over hospital payment decisions. As Bruce Vladeck [1981, 215]
argues, this was inevitable, for "extensiveregulationof health care providers is the
price we pay for not having nationalhealthinsurance."
The evolution of health care financingpolicy illustratesa larger point about the
effectiveness of countervailingpower, for the growth of federal interventionwas
unable either to solve the government's own fiscal crisis or to stem the long-term
trend toward increased health care spending. While TEFRA and PPS reduced the
use of inpatient hospital services, hospitals adapted to the new fiscal climate by
shifting patients to more profitableoutpatientsettings or to home care, which continued to operate on a cost-based, fee-for-service basis. The federal government's
shift from passive accommodationof providers' interestsin the 1950s and 1960s to
the use of centralized behavioral controls in the 1980s led hospitals to reinvent
themselves, for Medicare accounted for more than 40 percent of the average community hospital's gross patient revenues [Iglehart 1993]. The policy changes in
Medicare reimbursement,which began in the early 1970s, created a "ratcheteffect"
[see Higgs 1987] as the Medicare program's growing share of the federal budget
and its centralrole in preservingthe balancedbudgetagreementled to a steady escalation of federal influence over the hospital industry. The failure of early government cost-containment initiatives led to calls for more sweeping government
controls-further cutbacksin providerpaymentswere a cornerstoneof the 1997 balanced budget agreementbetween the Clintonadministrationand the Republicancongressional leadership.
Although the federal government's relationshipwith the hospital industry resembled the "close fusion" between the state and the technostructuredescribed by
Galbraith[1971] at mid-century,over the past two decades the interests of federal
policymakers and industry representativesdiverged. From the 1940s through the
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1960s, "membersof the technostructurework[ed] closely with their public counterparts . . . in advising them of their needs" [Galbraith1971, 395]. By the early
1970s, however, the health care technostructurefaced an increasinglyautonomous
state whose needs had changed. New policies, in short, had produceda new style of
politics [Brown 1983], as the federally subsidized cost explosion in the health care
industryled to the developmentof a new policy image thatplaced cost containment,
not improved access, at the top of the nation's health policy agenda. Hospitals had
won the battle over nationalhealth insurancein earlier decades, but in the long run,
incrementalchanges in health care financingsteadily erodedthe industry'sfiscal and
managerialautonomy.
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